

Message Text

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6230
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 02689

CW MESSAGE NO. 33

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ROUND
SEVEN: TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 21, 1978

REF: GENEVA 02407

1. SUMMARY: DURING PLENARY MEETING FEBRUARY 21, USDEL
MADE STATEMENT (TEXT BELOW) RESPONDING IN PART TO
SOVIET FEBRUARY 13 STATEMENT (REFTEL) AND FOCUSING ON
MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES RELATED TO VERIFICATION (I.E.,
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS,
DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS, AND DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES.
SOVIET DEL INDICATED DISSATISFACTION WITH U.S. FAILURE
TO RESPOND TO QUESTIONS ON IRRITANTS AND OTHER ISSUES
ASKED BY SOVDEL ON FEBRUARY 13. END SUMMARY.

2. THE TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE US-USSR NEGOTIA-
TIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS HELD TUESDAY AFTERNOON,
FEBRUARY 21, AT THE U.S. MISSION.

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3. U.S. REP (FISHER) STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. AMBASSADOR:

- HAVING READ YOUR COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT DELIVERED AT OUR PLENARY MEETING ON FEBRUARY 13, WE FIND MUCH WHICH IS ENCOURAGING AND MUCH WHICH IS CHALLENGING.
- THE ENCOURAGEMENT IS FOUND IN THE FACT THAT SOME OF THE VARIOUS AREAS WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, PARTICULARLY IN SOME OF THOSE RELATING TO SCOPE, OUR TWO SIDES APPEAR TO BE GETTING SOMEWHAT CLOSER TOGETHER. THE CHALLENGE COMES FROM THE FACT THAT THERE ARE STILL SERIOUS AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT IN SUBSTANCE AND THAT EVEN IN THOSE AREAS WHERE WE APPEAR TO BE GETTING CLOSER TOGETHER, ANY AGREEMENT IN SUBSTANCE WHICH MAY BE EMERGING, IS CLOUDED BY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN FORMULATION. THIS LEADS ME TO SUGGEST THAT IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE AFTER AN INTERVAL OF A WEEK OR SO, IN WHICH WE COULD APPRAISE EACH OTHER'S VIEWS, TO REFER THESE LATTER ISSUES BACK TO THE DRAFTING GROUP FOR FURTHER WORK.
- THE U.S. DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO ACT ON YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT WE DEFER, FOR THE TIME BEING, FURTHER CONSIDERATION ON THE CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ANY CONVENTION THAT MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED AND ALSO ON THE FORM THAT OUR HOPED-FOR JOINT INITIATIVE MIGHT TAKE. THIS BRINGS US, HOWEVER, TO THE THREE MAJOR ISSUES THAT NOW APPEAR TO SEPARATE US AND THEY ALL RELATE TO VERIFICATION. THEY INCLUDE:

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- -- MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS;
- -- VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS OF THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE; AND
- -- VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DISPOSITION OF FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE.
- THESE THREE PROBLEMS ARE, OF COURSE, CLOSELY RELATED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. EACH, HOWEVER, HAS SOME UNIQUE ASPECTS, AS WELL.
- THE FIRST OF THESE AREAS RELATES TO CHALLENGE INSPECTION WHICH THE U.S. HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE OBLIGATION UNDER THE CONVENTION.
- AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT PREVIOUSLY, THE U.S. FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION MUST PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS BEHAVIOR BY EITHER THE REQUESTING

PARTY OR THE HOST PARTY. IN OUR VIEW THIS REQUIRES, FIRST, THAT THE REASONS FOR A REQUEST MUST BE PRESENTED AND I BELIEVE WE ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT. SECOND, IT REQUIRES THAT THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BOTH INSPECTING PERSONNEL AND HOST STATE PERSONNEL MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD IN ADVANCE. OUR DELEGATION HAS NOTED THE STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS WILLING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. THE U.S., FOR ITS PART, HAS THIS MATTER UNDER REVIEW AND WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE A DETAILED PRESENTATION ON THIS MATTER AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. THIRD, IT REQUIRES THAT THERE BE A LEGAL OBLIGATION TO GIVE A FULL EXPLANATION IF

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6231
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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A REQUEST IS TURNED DOWN.

- AT OUR LAST PLENARY, THE SOVIET SIDE REFERRED TO ITS EARLIER STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 28 AND STATED THAT A REFUSAL OF A STATE TO ACCEDE TO A REQUEST FOR AN ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD NOT AFFECT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONVENTION IF ACCOMPANIED BY A CONVINCING EXPLANATION AS TO THE UNSUBSTANTIATED NATURE OF THE REQUEST FOR THE INSPECTION. WITH THE GREATEST RESPECT, HOWEVER, YOU DID NOT, EITHER IN YOUR STATEMENT OF LAST WEEK, OR IN YOUR STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1977, CLEAR UP THE SOVIET POSITION ON THIS MATTER. WE ARE AWARE OF THE SOVIET POSITION THAT IT COULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO TURN DOWN A WELL-FOUNDED CHALLENGE WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE EXPLANA-

TION. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE IS WILLING TO ACCEPT A LEGAL OBLIGATION IN THE CONVENTION TO PROVIDE SUCH AN EXPLANATION.

- THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS IN THE SECOND AREA-
VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS - ARE EQUALLY FAR
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APART. WE HAVE EXPLAINED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL WHY THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE IN THE TREATY FOR ON-SITE VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS. WHILE SUCH ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WOULD BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE, THE DESTRUCTION WOULD BE COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE STATE CARRYING IT OUT. THE ON-SITE INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT DURING THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS, BUT HOW THIS RIGHT IS EXERCISED WOULD PRESUMABLY BE BASED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHEMICALS BEING DESTROYED. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS RESISTED THIS APPROACH BASICALLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT MIGHT BE PREJUDICIAL TO SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO SIT DOWN WITH THE SOVIET SIDE AND SEEK TO DEVELOP ON-SITE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS REGARD WHICH TAKE THE SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT. IN MY JUDGMENT, IF WE ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN OUR EFFORTS TO PROHIBIT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEN WE MUST FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO AGREED ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS.

VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE REPRESENT A THIRD SET OF IMPORTANT UNRESOLVED VERIFICATION QUESTIONS. THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES DIFFER VERY SUBSTANTIALLY. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES THAT "CAPABILITIES" BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED AND THAT ON-SITE INSPECTION BE CONDUCTED ONLY ON A CHALLENGE BASIS. THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED THAT "FACILITIES" BE DECLARED AND ELIMINATED AND THAT STATES AGREE IN THE CONVENTION TO PERMIT INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS TO CONFIRM THAT THESE OBLIGATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT.

IN ALL CANDOR, MR. AMBASSADOR, OUR CONCERN IS THAT WITHOUT DECLARATION OF FACILITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ON-
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SITE INSPECTION OF THEM THERE WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE ABILITY TO PRODUCE THE MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. YOU HAVE STATED

A CONCERN THAT IDENTIFYING SUCH FACILITIES AND PERMITTING INSPECTORS TO VISIT THEM COULD LEAD TO DISCLOSURES OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN UNRELATED AREAS.

IN MY STATEMENT AT THE TENTH PLENARY MEETING I EXPLAINED WHY WE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS DEALING WITH FACILITIES WAS WHOLLY INADEQUATE AND WHY OUR PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT PROVOKE APPREHENSION ON THE SOVIET SIDE. IF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION WHICH TAKES THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES INTO ACCOUNT, THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL BE READY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT IF THE SOVIET DELEGATION CONTINUES TO IGNORE THE CONCERNS OF THE U.S., THEN I DO NOT BELIEVE THE PROSPECTS FOR A JOINT INITIATIVE WILL BE VERY GOOD.

IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OF VERIFICATION IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP FIRMLY IN MIND WHAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE ALL ABOUT. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE A CONVENTION WHICH PROHIBITS THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKPILES AND FACILITIES. WE ARE NOT MERELY WORKING ON A CONVENTION DEALING WITH THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS; WE ALREADY HAVE SUCH A CONVENTION IN THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925, TO WHICH BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES ARE PARTIES. THERE MAY BE SOME DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF 1925, BUT THE AREAS OF DIFFERENCE ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY LARGE TO JUSTIFY AN ENDEAVOR OF THE MAGNITUDE REQUIRED FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS CONVENTION. BECAUSE THE PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONVENTION WE ARE NOW NEGOTIATING RELATES TO THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS AND DISMANTLING OF FACILITIES, THE UNITED STATES PUTS PRIMARY IMPORTANCE ON THE VERIFICATION OF THESE OBLIGATIONS.

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INRE-00 NRC-05 DOEE-00 /144 W

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IN THIS CONNECTION, AND IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO
POINT OUT THAT, IN DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS OVER THE YEARS,
THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT OBJECT TO EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION
OF ACTUAL REDUCTIONS. IN FACT, THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET
POSITION ON VERIFICATION COULD BE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:
VERIFICATION OF THOSE ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED AND DESTROYED
--YES; VERIFICATION OF EXISTING OR REMAINING LEVELS OF
ARMAMENTS--NO. OUR POSITION ON THE SUBJECT HAS NOT BEEN AS
RESTRICTIVE, AND WE CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THIS POSITION.
NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT EVEN UNDER THE SOVIET BASIC
APPROACH ONE COULD NOT OBJECT TO THE VERIFICATION PROVI-
SIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

WE ARE DEALING WITH THE VERIFICATION OF ARMAMENTS AND
FACILITIES TO BE REDUCED AND DISPOSED OF. WE ARE SEEKING
TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS FROM THE ARSENALS
OF STATES. THESE WEAPONS ARE GENERALLY CONSIDERED WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THEY ARE NOT HYPOTHETICAL. THEY HAVE
BEEN STOCKPILED IN LARGE QUANTITIES AND ARE MILITARILY
IMPORTANT.

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IN SHORT, MR. AMBASSADOR, WE ARE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A
MEASURE FOR REAL DISARMAMENT. THIS STEP REQUIRES CORRES-
PONDING APPROACHES TO VERIFICATION. REGRETTABLY, TRUST
ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. IF TRUST ALONE WERE SUFFICIENT THE
WEAPONS WOULD NOT EXIST IN THE FIRST PLACE.

END TEXT.

4. AMBASSADOR LIKHATCHEV (HEAD OF SOVDEL) SAID SOVIET
DELEGATION WOULD STUDY U.S. STATEMENT BUT INDICATED
DISSATISFACTION THAT THE U.S. DEL HAD NOT RESPONDED TO ALL
THE "QUITE SPECIFIC" QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN
THE SOVIET FEBRUARY 13 STATEMENT (I.E., QUESTIONS ON THE

U.S. POSITION ON THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION, IRRITANTS, ETC. HE NOTED THAT FORMAL U.S. RESPONSES IN PLENARY TO SOVIET FEBRUARY 13 QUESTIONS WOULD ASSIST DRAFTING GROUP IN WORKING MORE PRODUCTIVELY. FISHER SAID U.S. DEL CONTINUED ITS REVIEW OF SOVIET STATEMENT AND WOULD RESPOND TO REMAINING QUESTIONS AS APPROPRIATE.

5. DATE OF NEXT PLENARY MEETING WAS LEFT OPEN; NEXT MEETING OF THE DRAFTING GROUP IS SET FOR FEBRUARY 27.
VANDEN HEUVEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CHEMICAL WARFARE, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA02689
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780078-0537
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780234/aaaabcft.tel
Line Count: 342
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8c0661d3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 GENEVA 2407
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3539225
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ROUND SEVEN: TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 21, 1978
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8c0661d3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014